Of the two main views on singular thought, the Significance View has been favored over the Acquaintance View due to its ability to accommodate a broader range of cases of intuitively singular thought. However, King (2020) has challenged the Significance View by presenting a purported counterexample in which a subject perceives an object and goes on to form a thought about it without that object ever becoming significant to them.
Since all parties agree that such cases of perception-based thought are paradigmatic cases of singular thought, King's counterexample may initially appear decisive. In this paper, I defend the Significance View against the purported counterexample. By integrating recent work in cognitive science and affordance-based theories of perception, I develop a more nuanced account of significance and its connection to action and perception. I show that this account, while still being in line with its initial motivation, renders the Significance View immune to King's purported counterexample.