SYMPOSIUM BILINGUE:

Culpable / IGNORANCE / Coupable

Much has been written about how intentional actions essentially relate to various mental states as their causal, explanatory, rational or constitutive antecedents: belief-desire pairs (Davidson), practical knowledge (Anscombe), plans (Bratman), and evaluative judgments, like judging an action is good as part of performing it (the guise of the good).

Ignorance, likewise, can be an essential antecedent, in some sense, of intentional action. Regularly, we explain our actions, especially our mistakes, by reference to our ignorance about things. Yet unlike beliefs and desires, practical knowledge, or plans, ignorance is typically a negative state, often not luminous, agential or expressive, and this presents challenges to understanding its role in agency and intentional action.

In this symposium, “Culpable / IGNORANCE / Coupable” three speakers will present for 30 minutes each (flexible) on complementary questions about the relationship between acting from ignorance and culpability. These talks will be of interest to and stimulating for a wide philosophical audience, as they touch on issues in philosophy of action, epistemology, philosophy of law, and in moral philosophy and normativity.

Ignorance of the Law
Sayid Bnefsi, Ph.D./J.D., Postdoc, University of Neuchâtel / University of Johannesburg (ACEPS)

I use legal theory about ignorance of the law to illuminate two philosophical principles about defenses across criminal and tort law. The conventional wisdom about ignorance of the law is that it does not excuse our actions. Across law and philosophy, there are political and moral arguments for this rule. Yet many of these arguments concede that there are and should be exceptions. On both scores, I disagree. Legally speaking, being ignorant of the law can negate an offense, but that does not necessarily make it an excuse. However, rationally speaking, I argue that ignorance of the law should not be a defense, let alone an excuse. Since knowledge of the law should not make breaking it more culpable than it would be, ignorance of the law should not make breaking it less culpable than it would be.

Ignorance coupable, négligence et choix
Antoine Dang-Van, doctorant, FR/ENG, University of Neuchâtel

Il arrive certes que l'ignorance excuse. Mais l'ignorance n'excuse pas toujours, du moins entièrement. Ainsi, à une personne qui se défend en arguant avec sincérité qu'elle ne savait littéralement pas ce qu'elle faisait, il semble parfois justifié de répondre qu'elle aurait dû le savoir.

On peut formaliser ce problème sous la forme d'un trilemme : soit une personne « S » (par exemple « Sasha ») et une action ou une omission « V », présente ou passée, qui, par hypothèse, est un méfait (par exemple « tuer » ou « laisser mourir »). Les propositions suivantes paraissent toutes prima facie plausibles bien que leur conjonction soit contradictoire :

- (1) Si S est blâmable de V-er, S V volontairement

- (2) Si S V par ignorance, S ne V pas volontairement

- (3) Si S V par ignorance, S est blâmable de V-er (quand cette ignorance est coupable)

Je soutiens qu'il faut rejeter (2). Il est faux que si S V par ignorance, S ne V pas volontairement. Mon argument est en bref que si S V par ignorance, S V néanmoins volontairement si cette ignorance est elle-même volontaire. Pour qu'elle le soit, il suffit que S ait dû et ait pu remédier à cette ignorance, c'est-à-dire que son statut lui en a donné l'obligation et qu'elle en a eu l'aptitude et l'opportunité. Je défends alors que S a choisi d'enfreindre une obligation en demeurant dans l'ignorance. J'en conclus que S, bien qu'elle V par ignorance, est dans ce cas blâmable parce qu'elle V volontairement.

Willful Blindness and Suspicion
Oscar Piedrahita, Ph.D., postdoc, ENG, University of Barcelona (LOGOS) / University of Johannesburg (ACEPS)

When courts treat willful blindness (aka willful ignorance) as equivalent to knowledge in determining criminal culpability—as when a smuggler deliberately avoids confirming suspected illegal items, like drugs, in his cargo—they raise questions about the nature of ignorance. Can someone be considered ignorant of a fact they suspect to be true? This question becomes pressing when examined through recent epistemological debates about ignorance, as suggested by Sayid Bnefsi (2024). For instance, the Access View (Piedrahita 2021) defines ignorance of a fact p as the lack of epistemic access to p, where S has epistemic access just in case she truly believes p through her epistemic capacities. Epistemic access to p thus excludes ignorance. But Bnefsi (2024) argues that willful blindness is a counterexample to the Access View. If S suspects p but deliberately avoids confirming p, they seem to both have epistemic access to p (through their well-grounded suspicion) and lack it (by being ignorant). Under the Access View, willful ignorance seems to include what it should exclude.

Here, I will show that willful blindness not only fails to challenge the Access View but actually supports it. Willful blindness is the deliberate avoidance of epistemic access. By conceiving it this way, we gain insight into the nature of both willful ignorance and suspicion. Epistemic access and suspicion are different epistemic states. Epistemic access requires truly believing p. Yet one can suspect p in the absence of a belief that p. Therefore, suspecting doesn't involve epistemic access. Since willful ignorance entails suspicion, willful ignorance and epistemic access are mutually exclusive. This insight not only solves the initial puzzle but also aims to motivate further questions about suspicion in order to understand the nature of partial epistemic states, such as willful ignorance.