Par auteur > Mudry Léna

An inquirer seeks to find answers to her questions. I shall argue that for many inquiries INQ, opening, pursuing and closing INQ depends on an the inquirer's decision (DECISION). First, two subjects, S1 and S2 can have the same low level of confidence toward P, the same evidence for P, where P is an answer to a question Q, but only S2 continues to inquire. Second, a subject, S3, can have a very high level of confidence toward P but still not be willing to close her inquiry and continue it indefinitely. Finally, S4 can dismiss a question, while S5 takes it seriously as it is of some interests to her. The asymmetry between S1 and S2, the fact that inquiry might not have a built-in endpoint as well as the fact that S4 and S5 take up different questions, can be explained by DECISION. This should not strike as surprising. Yet, it has hardly been discussed since the recent epistemology's zetetic turn. Interestingly, doxastic attitudes have been characterized with respect to their function within inquiry. Suspension of judgement opens and prolongs inquiry, while outright belief closes it (Friedman 2017). In this paper, I aim at exploring the conjunction of DECISION with this last assumption. The account explored here as several significant consequences. For instance, if opening, pursuing and closing an inquiry is a decision, it suggests that some level of voluntarism is true with respect to doxastic attitudes. Just as some practical considerations might bear on their appropriateness. If it is possible to prolong one's inquiry while having a high level of confidence and close it even if one has a low level of confidence, it suggests that credences and outright belief are relatively independent.